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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DRUMMOND FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, LLC, et al., 1 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC., 
et al.,2 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
2014CV253677 
Business Case Div. 4 
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
The above styled matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff 
TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's ("TitleMax Georgia") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"); and (2) Plaintiffs North 
American Title Loans, LLC ("NA TL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. 's ("CLM") Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.'s Twenty-Third Defense and 
Counterclaim for Unfair Competition ("NA TL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary 
The named Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants are: Drummond Financial Services, LLC; North 
American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a South 
Carolina limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company; 
North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Anderson Financial Services, LLC; 
LoanSmart, LLC; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title 
Loans, LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.; 
Meadowwood Financial Services, LLC; Select Management Funding, LLC; Andr, Inc.; Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.; 
Aycox, Inc.; Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans 
of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; and Mableton Car Title 
Loans, Inc. Plaintiffs are referred to collectively herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Drummond." 
2 The named Defendants and Counterclaimants are: TMX Finance Holdings, Inc.; TM.X Finance, LLC; TMX 
Credit, Inc.; TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TMX Finance of Virginia, Inc.; TitleMax of Virginia, 
Inc.; TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TMX Credit of New Mexico, LLC; TitleMax of 
Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.; TMX Finance of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; TitleMax of South 
Carolina, Inc.; and Does I through I 0. Defendants are referred to collectively herein as "Defendants" or "TitleMax". 
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Judgment"). Having considered the entire record and argument of counsel at a March 12, 2019 
hearing held in this matter, the Court orders as follows: 
SUMMARY 
This case concerns a dispute between businesses which compete in the title pawn 
industry. Plaintiffs are companies affiliated by a common ownership and control engaged in the 
business of making loans to consumers secured by motor vehicles ti.e. title pawns or loans). 
Plaintiffs include both loan brokers and direct lenders. Plaintiffs Drummond Financial Services, 
Inc. and LoanStar3 act as loan brokers in that they assist customers seeking to obtain title loans 
from third-party lenders.4 The remaining Plaintiffs are direct lenders who specialize in making 
title loans directly to consumers. The various TitleMax Defendants are part of a conglomerate of 
related companies also engaged in the title loan business, including brokers and direct lenders. 
Defendants are direct competitors of Plaintiffs and operate stores across the United States. 
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have committed various tortious acts while engaged m a 
nationwide campaign to systematically steal their customers. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that 
Defendants: (1) improperly accessed Department of Motor Vehicle ("DMV") records in 
violation of federal and state laws to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs' current and 
prospective customers and then used that information to solicit and divert Plaintiffs' customers to 
the Defendants; (2) improperly entered Plaintiffs' premises in order to solicit Plaintiffs' 
customers; and (3) offered Plaintiffs' employees monetary compensation for diverting Plaintiffs' 
current and prospective customers away from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted 
six claims against the Defendants including misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, 
"LoanStar" collectively refers to Plaintiffs Wellshire Financial Services LLC and Meadowwood Financial 
Services, LLC. 
4 LoanMax Title Loans was added as a Counterclaim Defendant by Court order but according to Plaintiffs it 
has never operated any of Plaintiffs' stores in Georgia and has never engaged in title lending. Second Amended 
Complaint ("SAC"), p. 10 n. I. 
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two counts of tortious interference with prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass 
and civil conspiracy. 
TitleMax Georgia asserts a counterclaim against North American Title Loans, LLC, a 
Georgia limited liability company ("NATL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. ("CLM") (and 
other Counterclaim Defendants), alleging they have violated the Georgia Pawnshop Act, 
O.C.G.A. §44-12-130 et seq., through their use of the word "loan" in their names and advertising 
("First Counterclaim"). 5 Based on the foregoing, TitleMax Georgia has asserted claims against 
NA TL and CLM for : ( 1) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; (2) unfair 
competition in violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil conspiracy. 
Additionally, certain TitleMax Claimants have asserted a second counterclaim alleging 
certain Drummond parties instructed employees to visit TitleMax stores falsely claiming to be 
customers looking for a title loan or posing as a potential recovery vendor, who then allegedly 
lied about needing to use the restroom to gain access to restricted, non-public areas ofTitleMax's 
stores in order to photograph their trade secret financial information ( contained on "goal 
boards"), information which is then allegedly shared throughout Plaintiffs' corporate structure. 
Based on the foregoing, the TitleMax Claimants have brought claims alleging: (1) trespass; 
(2) misappropriation and theft of trade secrets; (3) violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act; (4) conversion (in the alternative); (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) 
entitlement to litigation expenses. 
5 This counterclaim was titled "Twenty-Third Defense and Counterclaim of Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, 
Inc. Against Plaintiffs North American Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, and Cash Loans of 
Marietta, Inc." in Defendants' Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim filed on December 29, 2014 as well 
as in amended pleadings filed on August 17, 2017 and October 19, 2017. In Defendants' Answer and Affirmative 
Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended Counterclaims, filed on April 26, 2018, it is 
referred to as "First Counterclaim by Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. - Against Plaintiffs - Andr, Inc.; Atlanta 
Title Loans, Inc.; Aycox, Inc.; Aycox & Aycox, Clayton, Inc.; Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Ltd.; Aycox 
Enterprises, Ltd.; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.; Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.; Instant Cash Loans on Car 
Titles, Inc.; LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; Mableton Car Title Loans, Inc.; and North American Title Loans, LLC." 
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ANALYSIS 
I. Standard on Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment should be granted only when the movant shows "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court that the 
documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no 
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case." 
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 830, 525 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491,405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [O.C.G.A. §9-11-56], must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-11-56(e). 
"[A]t the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the evidence most 
favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 
possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. Spalding, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761 
S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga. 
846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244,246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary judgment is 
ambiguous or doubtful, the party opposing the motion must be given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the 
opposing party opposing the motion"). However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility 
[are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011) 
(quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712, 580 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2003)). 
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II. TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
TitleMax Georgia moves for summary judgment as to liability only on its First 
Counterclaim against NA TL and CLM for false advertising under the Lanham Act. NA TL was 
formed on August 10, 2001 and previously operated a store named "Cash Loans on Car Titles" 
located at 3122 Deans Bridge Road, Augusta, Georgia. CLM was formed on July 16, 1996 and 
previously operated a store named "Atlanta Title Loans" located at 2089 South Cobb Drive, 
Marietta, Georgia. However, in May 2015, CLM transferred the operation of its store to AndR, 
Inc., while NA TL transferred the operation of its store to Instant Cash Loans on Car Title, Inc. 
Nevertheless, insofar as NATL and CLM engaged in "pawn transactions", TitleMax Georgia 
alleges their use of the term "loans" in their advertising during the period of December 29, 2010 
through May 2015 (before they transferred the operation of their stores to different entities) 
violates the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-130 et seq.,6 and constitutes false 
advertising under the federal Lanham Act as a matter oflaw. 
A. Georgia Pawnshop Act 
"Pawn transactions are governed by the statutory scheme laid out with considerable 
specificity in the Georgia Pawnshop Act." Mack v. Georgia Auto Pawn, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 277, 
278, 585 S.E.2d 661, 662 (2003) (citing Glinton v. And R, Inc., 271 Ga. 864, 867, 524 S.E.2d 
481 (1999)). See Hooks v. Cobb Ctr. Pawn & Jewelry Brokers, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 305,309,527 
S.E.2d 566, 570 (1999) ("[T]he pawnbroker statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-12-130 et seq., 
comprehensively and specifically regulates the subject of pawnshop transactions"). Under the 
Act, "pawn transactions" means "any loan on the security of pledged goods or any purchase of 
pledged goods on the condition that the pledged goods may be redeemed or repurchased by the 
pledgor or seller for a fixed price within a fixed period of time." O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(3). 
6 Herein "Georgia Pawnshop Act" or "Act." 
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Further, "pawnbroker" is defined as: 
any person engaged in whole or in part in the business of lending money 
on the security of pledged goods, or in the business of purchasing tangible 
personal property on the condition that it may be redeemed or repurchased 
by the seller for a fixed price within a fixed period of time, or in the 
business of purchasing tangible personal property from persons or sources 
other than manufacturers or licensed dealers as a part of or in conjunction 
with the business activities described in this paragraph. 
O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(2). 
In 1992, the Georgia Pawnshop Act was amended extensively to, inter alia, address 
issues involving motor vehicle pawn transactions. See 1992 Ga. Laws 1426. See also J. Anthony 
Love, Pawnbrokers: Provide Comprehensive Legislation Regulating Loans on Motor Vehicle 
Titles, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 323 (1992). It has been said that the legislative purpose behind these 
changes was "a desire to bring uniformity to the pawnbroker industry and to reduce abusive and 
unconscionable agreements arising from motor vehicle title loans" and to "protect consumers." 
Id. at 326, 328. Most relevant to this litigation, the 1992 amendment added a provision which 
regulates advertising by pawnbrokers: 
Any pawnbroker as defined in paragraph (2) of Code Section 44-12-130 
shall include most prominently in any and all types of advertisements the 
word "pawn" or the words "pawn transaction." A pawnbroker shall not 
use the term "loan" in any advertisements or in connection with any 
advertising of the business of the pawnbroker; provided, however, that 
the provisions of this sentence shall not apply to a pawnbroker in 
business on March 1, 1992, which uses the term "loan" in connection 
with the name of the business or with advertising of the business. 
O.C.G.A. §44-12-138(a)(I) (emphasis added). This provision was "designed to eliminate 
confusion on the part of consumers as to what type of transaction is offered by a particular 
business such as a pawnbroker." Love, supra, at 327. See also State of Georgia ex rel. 
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of the State of Georgia v. First American Title Lending 
of Georgia, LLC, Superior Court of Fulton County, No. 2017CV297877 (lawsuit brought by the 
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Georgia Attorney General against a pawnbroker for using the term "loan" in advertising and not 
using "pawn" or "pawn transactions", taking the position that such conduct violates O.C.G.A. 
§44-12-138(a)(l) as well as the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. §10-1-393(a)). 
B. Lanham Act 
Here, TitleMax Georgia alleges NA TL and CLM's use of the term "loans" in their 
advertising not only violated the Georgia Pawnshop Act but also violated the Lanham Act. 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) creates a "federal cause of 
action for unfair competition." Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 
F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Univ. of Fla. v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 
1996)). It provides in relevant part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin,false or misleading description 
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(l)(B). 
"The intent of this provision is to protect "commercial interests [that] have been harmed 
by a competitor's false advertising, and [to secure] to the business community the advantages of 
reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to 
those who have not." Natural Answers, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 529 F.3d 1325, 
1330-31 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 
1156, 1168 (11th Cir.2007).7 
7 Section 45 of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 provides: 
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To succeed on a false advertising claim under 15 U.S.C.A. § l 125(a)(l)(B), a plaintiff 
must establish that: 
(1) the advertisements of the opposing party were false or misleading; 
(2) the advertisements deceived, or had the capacity to deceive, 
consumers; (3) the deception had a material effect on purchasing 
decisions; ( 4) the misrepresented product or service affects interstate 
commerce; and (5) the movant has been--0r is likely to be-injured as a 
result of the false advertising. 
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). 
The first element of the test above requires a plaintiff to show that the advertisements at 
issue were either "(l) commercial claims that are literally false as a factual matter" or "(2) claims 
that may be literally true or ambiguous but which implicitly convey a false impression, are 
misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers." Id. at 1261 (quoting United Indus. Corp. 
v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998)). See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 
218, 229 (2d Cir. 1999), as amended on reh'g (Sept. 29, 1999) ("There are two types of 
actionable false advertising: (1) advertising which makes claims which are literally false on their 
face, and (2) advertising which, although literally true on its face, is perceived by a significant 
proportion of the relevant market as making 'subliminal' or 'implicit' claims which are provably 
false. With regard to the second type of false advertising, the courts sometimes say that the 
advertising has a tendency to 'mislead, confuse or deceive"') ( citation omitted). 
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by 
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to 
protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial 
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to 
prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, 
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and 
remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and 
unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations. 
"Most of the enumerated purposes are relevant to false-association cases; a typical false-advertising case will 
implicate only the Act's goal of'protect [ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control of Congress] against 
unfair competition."' Lexmark Int'!. Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1389, 188 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2014). 
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[P]laintiffs alleging a literal falsehood are claiming that a statement, on its 
face, conflicts with reality, a claim that is best supported by comparing the 
statement itself with the reality it purports to describe. By contrast, 
plaintiffs alleging an implied falsehood are claiming that a statement, 
whatever its literal truth, has left an impression on the listener that 
conflicts with reality. This latter claim invites a comparison of the 
impression, rather than the statement, with the truth. 
Schering Corp .. 189 F.3d at 229 (citing Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under 
the Lanham Act: An Historical Review of Comments from the Bench, 954 PU/Corp. 83, 87-88 
(1996)). 
"A plaintiff attempting to establish the second kind of falsehood, that an advertisement is 
literally true but misleading, must "present evidence of deception" in the form of consumer 
surveys, market research, expert testimony, or other evidence. Consumer survey research often is 
a key part of a Lanham Act claim alleging that an advertisement is misleading or deceptive." 
Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1261 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson * Merck 
Consumer Phann. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp .. 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he 
success of a plaintiffs implied falsity claim usually turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer 
survey ... [W]here the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a statistically significant part of the 
commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged 
advertisement, the plaintiff cannot establish that it suffered any injury as a result of the 
advertisement's message"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F .2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 
1982) ("When the challenged advertisement is implicitly rather than explicitly false, its tendency 
to violate the Lanham Act by misleading, confusing or deceiving should be tested by public 
reaction"). 
To succeed on a claim of false advertising the plaintiff must also establish "materiality", 
i.e. that "the defendant's deception is likely to influence the [consumer's] purchasing decision." 
9 
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (1st 
Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). The materiality requirement, which must be established 
even when an advertisement is literally false, is based on the premise that not all deceptions 
affect consumer decisions." Id. at 1250. "A plaintiff may establish this materiality requirement 
by proving that 'the defendants misrepresented an inherent quality or characteristic of the 
product."' Id. ( quoting National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d 
Cir.1997)); Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010) (same). 
Further, 
in order for representations to constitute "commercial advertising or 
promotion" under Section [1125(a)], they must be: (I) commercial speech; 
(2) by a defendant who is in commercial competition with plaintiff; (3) for 
the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or 
services. While the representations need not be made in a "classic 
advertising campaign," but may consist instead of more informal types of 
"promotion," the representations (4) must be disseminated sufficiently to 
the relevant purchasing public to constitute "advertising" or "promotion" 
within that industry. 
Suntree Techs., Inc., 693 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. 
Inst. of Physics, 859 F.Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y.1994)). See also Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber & 
Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Advertising that affects interstate 
commerce and solicitation of sales across state lines or between citizens of the United States and 
citizens and subjects of a foreign nation is ... commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act"). 
Moreover, "[a] party seeking monetary damages for false advertising in violation of 15 
U.S.C. § l 125(a) of the Lanham Act must establish that it has been injured by the false 
advertising." Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 
2008). See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst., 284 F.3d at 311 ("[W]hereas a showing 
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that the defendant's activities are likely to cause confusion or to deceive customers is sufficient to 
warrant injunctive relief, a plaintiff seeking damages must show actual harm to its business"); 
Keg Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ("Compared to the 
showing necessary to obtain an injunction, a higher standard of proof is required to recover 
damages" for a Lanham Act violation); Practice Perfect, Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Pharm. Ass'n, 732 
F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ("Section 43(a) was not intended to provide a windfall for 
plaintiffs, and therefore the plaintiff must show that it sustained actual harm to its business as a 
result of the defendant's misrepresentations"). Thus, "to recover money damages under the 
[Lanham] Act, a "[p]laintiff must prove both actual damages and a causal link between [the] 
defendant's violation and those damages." United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 
1180 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 
93 F.3d 511, 515 (8th Cir. 1996)). See also 15 U.S.C. § l l l 7(a). 
C. Conclusions of Law 
TitleMax Georgia contends record evidence establishes NATL and CLM's use of the 
word "loan" in their advertising satisfies each element to show liability for false adverting under 
the Lanham Act: use of the word "loan" rather than "pawn" or "pawn transaction" constitutes a 
false or misleading description of fact or representation of fact as established under the Georgia 
Pawnshop Act; it was used in interstate commerce given that NATL and CLM advertise on the 
internet; the term "loan" was used in connection with commercial advertising regarding NA TL 
and CLM's services, pawn transactions; the description of a "pawn" as a "loan" misrepresents 
the nature of the pawn transaction; and TitleMax Georgia, as a direct competitor of NA TL and 
CLM in the title pawn business, has been or is likely to be damaged by NATL and CLM's acts. 
l l 
NATL and CLM note the parties are competitors in the title lending industry . Insofar as 
their business is to lend money to borrowers who use their car titles as collateral for the debt, 
they urge any reasonable person would understand that the products being offered are "loans" 
under any reasonable definition. They argue TitleMax Georgia essentially asks the Court to find 
that an alleged violation of the Georgia Pawnshop Act constitutes a per se violation of the 
Lanham Act. Although TitleMax Georgia takes the position that a "title pawn" and a "title loan" 
are not the same things, the Georgia Pawnshop Act itself defines a "pawn transaction" as a type 
of "loan." Additionally, NATL and CLM assert the motion fails because TitleMax Georgia has 
not pointed to record evidence establishing as a matter of law that any consumers have actually 
been deceived or that TitleMax has been or is likely to be damaged by NATL and CLM's use of 
the word "loan" in their advertising. 
Having considered the record, the Court finds that questions of material fact preclude 
summary judgment. This is not a case of literally false advertising. The Georgia Pawnshop Act 
requires pawnbrokers to include in their advertising the words "pawn" and "pawn transaction" 
and prohibits their use of the term "loan" in advertising their business. However, the Act itself 
defines a "pawnbroker" as "any person engaged in whole or in part in the business of lending 
money on the security of pledged goods" and defines "pawn transaction" to include "any loan on 
the security of pledged goods." See O.C.G.A. §44-12-130(2) and (3), supra. See also Black's 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "loan" as "[a]n act oflending; a grant of something for 
temporary use ... esp., a sum of money lent at interest"; defining "secured loan" as a "loan that is 
secured by property or securities"; defining "title loan" as "[a] short-term high-interest loan 
secured by the borrower's car or other motor vehicle"). 
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Although there may be material distinctions between title pawns and traditional loans, 
NATL and CLM's use of the word "loan" in advertising is not literally false on its face and 
whether it is misleading or likely to deceive consumers remains a jury question. In supplemental 
briefing, TitleMax cites to two double-blind consumer surveys (one online and one by telephone) 
of more than 300 Georgians that was implemented by Nicholas M. Didow, Ph.D. The surveys 
were designed to measure "Georgia consumers' attitudes, behavioral intentions, and preferences 
for a title loan company offering title loans versus a title pawn company offering title pawns" to 
enable Dr. Didow "to offer a research-based professional opinion as to whether LoanMax was 
and is likely advantaged in the Georgia marketplace by positioning and marketing itself as a title 
loan company offering title loans rather than as a title pawn company offering title pawns.:" 
Based on the results Dr. Didow opines, inter alia, that: the surveys provide "strong 
compelling evidence that a company like LoanMax would be viewed more favorably in the 
Georgia marketplace and would be more advantaged in the Georgia marketplace as a title loan 
company offering title loan products, rather than as a title pawn company offering title pawn 
products"; Georgia consumers vary considerably as to whether they think "title loans" and "title 
pawns" are the same thing or different things, with the largest percentage of respondents 
indicating they "don't know"; however, title "loan" companies offering title "loan" products are 
consistently rated more favorably than title "pawn" companies offering title "pawns" and 
respondents strongly preferred title "loan" companies when presented with a choice between the 
two.9 
Although these results may generally support TitleMax's allegations and claims, they are 
not dispositive. In the final analysis, how compelling the survey results are and the weight to be 
Supplement to Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Ex. A (Affidavit of Nicholas Didow) at Ex. I ("Didow Report") at p. 3. 
9 DidowReportatpp. 8, 14-15, 19. 
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given to them remain important jury questions. Relatedly, whether Plaintiffs' use of the word 
"loan" in advertising is "misleading in context" or is "likely to deceive" or confuse consumers, 
whether it is likely to influence consumer's purchasing decisions, and whether TitleMax Georgia 
has been injured as a result present genuine disputes of material fact (among others) that cannot 
be determined as a matter of law based on the record of this action. TitleMax Georgia's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
III. NA TL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
NA TL and CLM move for summary judgment on all claims asserted in TitleMax 
Georgia's First Counterclaim, i.e. (1) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; 
(2) unfair competition in violation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil 
conspiracy. 
A. Lanham Act claim 
NA TL and CLM assert they are entitled to summary judgment on TitleMax Georgia false 
advertising claim under the Lanham Act for the same reasons set forth in their opposition to 
TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. However, for the reasons 
summarized above, the Court finds material questions of fact preclude summary judgment on 
this claim. To the extent NA TL and CLM assert their use of the word "loan" in advertising is not 
false or misleading to a reasonable consumer as a matter oflaw, it appears the State has taken the 
position that such conduct constitutes an "unfair or deceptive" practice "in the conduct of 
consumer transactions" such that it violates the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. 
§ 10-1-393(a). See State of Georgia ex rel. Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of the State of 
Georgia v. First American Title Lending of Georgia, LLC, Superior Court of Fulton County, No. 
2017CV297877 (lawsuit brought by the Georgia Attorney General against a pawnbroker for 
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using the term "loan" in advertising and not using "pawn" or "pawn transactions", taking the 
position that such conduct violates O.C.G.A. §44-12-138(a)(l) as well as the Georgia Fair 
Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(a)). Construing the evidence most favorably to 
TitleMax Georgia as the non-movant and giving it the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 
possible inferences, whether NATL and CLM's prior use of the word "loan" in their advertising 
constitutes actionable false advertising under the Lanham Act presents a jury question. NA TL 
and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to this claim. 
B. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act claim 
TitleMax Georgia alleges NATL and CLM (and the other Counterclaim-Defendants) 
have engaged in a deceptive trade practice by representing that services provided by them have 
characteristics that they do not have; namely that the pawns they offer are loans.l" TitleMax 
Georgia seeks injunctive relief, enjoining the Counterclaim Defendants from further use of the 
term "loan" in their names and advertising. 11 
Under Georgia's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act ("UDTPA"), "[a] person 
engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business ... he ... [r]epresents that 
goods or services have ... characteristics ... that he does not have" or "advertises goods or services 
with intent not to sell them as advertised." O.C.G.A.§ 10-l-372(a)(5) and (9). "A person likely to 
be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it 
under the principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable." O.C.G.A. § 1 O- l- 
373(a). However, only injunctive relief is available as "[i]t is well established that monetary 
relief is not authorized under the [UDTPA]." Akron Pest Control v. Radar Exterminating Co., 
10 Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' Amended 
Counterclaims, First Counterclaim, i!3 7. 
11 Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Second Amended Complaint and Defendants' A.mended 
Counterclaims, First Counterclaim, ,i4 l. 
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216 Ga. App. 495,498,455 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1995) (citation omitted). Further, "[t]he UDTPA 
does not address past harm .... To state a claim and to establish standing under the UDTPA, [the] 
[p]laintiffs must allege that they are likely to be damaged in the future by an unfair trade 
practice." Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 347 Ga. App. 13, 20, 815 S.E.2d 639,646 (2018), 
reconsideration denied (July 16, 2018). 
Here, pretermitting whether use of the word "loan" in pawn transaction advertising 
constitutes a deceptive trade practice under the UDTPA, currently NATL and CLM "[do]not 
operate any stores in Georgia" nor do they "broker, refinance, or advertise title loans."12 Insofar 
as NA TL and CLM are no longer engaged in any title lending business or advertising in Georgia, 
TitleMax Georgia cannot show that it is likely to be damaged in the future" by NA TL and 
CLM's conduct. Thus, TitleMax Georgia's request for injunctive relief under the UDTPA 
specifically against NA TL and CLM is moot. See Goodrich v. Bank of Am., N.A., 329 Ga. App. 
41, 42, 762 S.E.2d 628, 630 (2014) ("A case is moot when its resolution would amount to the 
determination of an abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights").13 Accordingly, 
NA TL and CLM's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to 
TitleMax Georgia's UDTPA claim against them. 
C. Civil conspiracy claim 
TitleMax Georgia alleges NA TL and CLM "have conspired with each other to engage in 
deceptive trade practices by representing to the public that they are allowed to use the term 'loan' 
in their names and advertising." 
A conspiracy upon which a civil action for damages may be founded is a 
combination between two or more persons either to do some act which is a 
tort, or else to do some lawful act by methods which constitute a tort. 
12 Kenneth Wayco Aff. (October 12, 2017), ii,r 6- 7. 
The viability of TitleMax Georgia's UDTPA claim against the entities currently operating "Cash Loans on 
Car Titles" and "Atlanta Title Loans" is not before the Court in the instant motions. 
13 
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Where civil liability for a conspiracy is sought to be imposed, the 
conspiracy itself furnishes no cause of action. The gist of the action, if a 
cause of action exists, is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed 
against the plaintiff and the resulting damage. 
Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 328-29, 116 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 ( 1960) ( citing Martha Mills v. 
Moseley, 50 Ga. App. 536, 179 S.E. 159, 161 (1935)). Thus, "[a]bsent the underlying tort, there 
can be no liability for civil conspiracy." Hartsock v. Rich's Employees Credit Union, 279 Ga. 
App. 724,726,632 S.E.2d 476,478 (2006) (citation omitted). 
NA TL and CLM urge that because as a matter of law they are not liable for any violation 
of the Lanham Act or Georgia's UDTPA, TitleMax Georgia's claim for civil conspiracy also 
fails as a matter of law. However, insofar as TitleMax Georgia's Lanham Act claim survives, its 
conspiracy claim predicated on that Act survives as well. Accordingly, NATL and CLM's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim 
premised on the Lanham Act claim and is GRANTED with respect to the civil conspiracy claim 
predicated on the failed UDTP A claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, the Court hereby: DENIES TitleMax Georgia's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART NATL and CLM's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment as set forth above. 
SO ORDERED this / :VaayofMarch, 2019. 
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